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RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY: STATE v. WATKINS
AND THE NEW CRIMINAL CODE
Steven J. Harman
THE PROBLEM

The possessor of stolen property poses a frustrating problem for
Montana's prosecuting attorneys. This is especially true where there
is little evidence indicating whether the possessor is a thief or a receiver.
The crux of the problem is that if the information charges him with
receiving stolen property, the accused might claim in defense that he
stole the property and is exempt from conviction for receiving. The
Montana supreme court was confronted with this dilemma in State v.
Watkins.'
The purpose of this note is to examine the problem associated with
cases involving the possessor of stolen property. The impact of State
v. Watkins2 on the area of receiving stolen property will be analyzed
in some detail. Furthermore, special consideration will be given to the
relevant provisions of the new Montana Criminal Codes and the possible
effect of the Code on the crime of receiving stolen property.
STATE V. WATKINS
Defendant Watkins was discovered with horses recently stolen from
Colorado and California on his property near Roundup, Montana. Watkins claimed that he knew the horses were there but assumed that they
belonged to a neighbor, except for one which he claimed as a gift from
4
a friend for stud fees.
The very presence of the horses on the defendant's property was
presumptive evidence that he had stolen the horses. 5 Rather than charging him with theft, the prosecution elected to charge Watkins with
receiving stolen property, for which he was subsequently convicted.
Watkin's contention on appeal was that the evidence invoked the
statutory presumption that he was guilty of theft of livestock. Therefore, prosecution for receiving stolen property would exempt him from
conviction. 6 In dismissing this argument, the court stated:
1
State v. Watkins, 156 Mont. 456, 481 P.2d 689 (1971).
2Id.
8Laws of Montana (1973), Ch. 513, § 1 (MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE OF 1973, Title 94,
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), effective January 1, 1974) [hereinafter cited
as M.C.C. 1973].
4
State v. Watkins, supra note 1 at 690, 691.
5
REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, § 94-2704.1 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
This section reads as follows:
§ 94-2704.1. Possession of stolen livestock as evidence of larcency. The possession,
claim of ownership, or control over recently stolen livestock shall be deemed prima
facie evidence of guilt of larcency unless this presumption is rebutted or contradicted
by other credible evidence.
OState v. Watkins, supra note 1 at 691.
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. . . the special evidentiary presumption is to aid in the prosecution of livestock theft cases. This presumption must be overcome by the defendant in these cases of livestock theft. This presumption is specifically confined to cases brought under 94-2704.1,
R.C.M., 1947, and in no case carries over as a burden for the State
to overcome in the prosecution of receiving stolen property.'

Watkins also contended that the State had failed to prove that
someone else had taken the horses. He cited State v. Guilbert8 as controlling authority for this proposition relying on the following statement
in that case: "A necessary and essential element of the crime of receiving stolen property is that of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt
that the property be stolen by someone other than the defendant." 9 The
court held that this statement was nothing more than an expression
of the court's concern that the defendant be protected from being
charged with both larceny and receiving stolen property arising out
of the same act.' 0 The justices concluded that neither the receiving
stolen property statute nor the case law prior to Guilbert imposed on
the state the burden of proving that someone other than the accused
had stolen the. property." Therefore, the case was overruled on that
2
point.'
The supreme court was careful in overruling Guilbert to preserve the
necessary elements of receiving stolen property and specifically restated
them: "(1) that the property was stolen; (2) that the defendant bought
it or received it knowing it to have been stolen; and (3) he did so for
'3
his own gain or to prevent the owner from regaining possession of it."'
With the elements of receiving stolen property firmly established
and the presumptive evidence statute relating to livestock placed in
its proper perspective, the next question raised is what effect the new
theft statute in the new Code will have on receiving stolen property.
A portion of Montana's new theft statute relevant to a discussion concerning receiving stolen property provides:
§ 94-6-302.

Theft.

(1)
A person commits the offense of theft when he purposely
or knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property
of the owner, and:
(a) Has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or
(b) Purposely or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the
property in such manner as to deprive the owner of the property; or
(c)
Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such

use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner
of the property.

7

1d. at 692.
'State v. Guilbert, 126 Mont. 171, 146 P.2d 814 (1952).
'Id.at 816.
"State v. Watkins, supra note 1 at 691.
nCiting as authority: State v. Moxely, 41 Mont. 402, 110 P. 83 (1910); State V.
Simn, 92 Mont. 541, 16 P.2d 411 (1933); State v. Keays, 97 Mont. 404, 34 P.2d
855 (1934).
"2State v. Watkins, supra note 1 at 692.
3•d.
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(3) A person commits the offense of theft when he purposely
or knowingly obtains control over stolen property knowing the propby another, and: [has any of the mental
erty to have been stolen
states described above.) 1

Since Montana's new theft statute is based upon the Illinois Criminal
Code,' 5 a brief history of case law dealing with receiving stolen property in Illinois before and after the adoption of their Criminal Code
may indicate the approach that Montana will pursue.
ILLINOIS LAW
Prior to the adoption of their Criminal Code in 1961, Illinois
had basically the same statute for receiving stolen property in Montana. 16 The elements required for conviction were clearly stated in People
v. Holtzman :17
To sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the proof must
show: (1) that the property has in fact been stolen by a person
other than the one receiving it; (2) that the one receiving it has
actually received the property stolen or aided in concealing it; (3)
that the receiver knew the property was stolen at the time of receiving; and, (4) that he received the property for his own gain or to
prevent the owner from again possessing it.'
Except for the first element, Montana's requirements were substantially
similar.
In 1961 Illinois adopted their new Criminal Code.
relevant to receiving stolen property provide:

§ 16-1.

The sections

Theft.

A person commits theft when he knowingly:
(a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the property of
the owner; or
(d) Obtains control over stolen property knowingly the property
to have been stolen by another or under such circumstances as
would reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen,
and
(1) Intends to deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the
property; or
(2) Knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in such a
manner as to deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit;
or
-(3) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use,
concealment, or abandonment will deprive the owner permanently
of such use and benefit."

The remarks of the Illinois commentators, which follow this section,
1"M.C.C. 1973, § 94-6-302.
5

1 ILLINOIS

REvISED STATUTES 1963, Ch. 38, § 16-1 [hereinafter cited as Ill. Rev. Stat.

1963].
'OSMITH-HURD ILLINOIS ANNOTATED STATUTES
7
' People v. Holtzman, 1 Ill.2d 562, 116 N.E.2d

1Id. at 342.
19ILL. REv. STAT. 1963, Ch. 38, § 16-1.

1935, Ch. 38, § 492.
338 (1954).
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and those of the Montana Criminal Law Commission accompanying
M.C.C., 1973, § 94-6-302 illustrate the respective drafting committees'
intent to combine various acts and mental states to cover every conceivable type of theft.20 The committees point out that Illinois Revised
Statutes, 1963, § 16-1(d) and M.C.C. 1973, § 94-6-302(3), relating to
receiving stolen property, were included to cover situations which might
not be considered by the first subsection of the theft statute. 21
In People v. Berg,22 the Illinois court required prosecutors filing
informations under Ill. Rev. Stat., 1963, § 16-1(d) to prove the four
traditional elements of receiving stolen property as set forth in the
Holtzman decision. Apparently the new statute had no effect in changing the requirements of proof for receiving stolen property. Were the
Illinois prosecuting attorneys to be shackled forever with the difficult
common law elements of receiving stolen property? Definitely not! An
important case, People v. Marino,23 indicates that receiving stolen property is not confined exclusively to Ill. Rev. Stat., 1963, § 16-1(d). Thus,
it appears that Illinois prosecutors are not required to establish two very
difficult elements of proof: (1) that the property was stolen by someone other than the accused receiver; and, (2) that the defendant knew
the property was stolen at the time he took possession. 24 A brief discussion of Marino will prove informative.
Defendant Marino and four companions were discovered by the
police carrying cases of stolen drugs from Marino's garage and loading
them into the back of a truck. Six months prior to this discovery, the
same drugs had been stolen from the Louis Zahn Drug Company. The
thief was neither apprehended nor identified. Evidence concerning the
manner in which Marino came into possession of the drugs was unclear.
This posed a puzzling situation to the prosecuting attorneys because
it was difficult to determine whether the defendants were thieves or
receivers. The information was filed under Ill. Rev. Stat., 1963, § 16-1(a)
(1): "knowingly obtaining and exerting control over certain property
of the Louis Zahn Drug Company, intending to permanently deprive
the owner of the use and benefit of said property in violation of the
Criminal Code."' 2 5 Marino and three of the four others were found guilty.
The three co-defendants filed a separate appeal.
The first contention of error raised by the defendants was that
they were charged with the wrong section of the theft statute. They
felt that they should have been indicted for "obtaining control over
(Revised by Charles H. Bowman), ILL. REV. STAT. 1963,
CRIMINAL LAW COMMISSION COMMENT, REVISED PROPOSED MONTANA

"'COMMITTEE COMMENTS-1961

Ch. 38, § 16-1;

CRIMINAL CODE (1973),

§ 94-6-302.

~d.

Tm

27People v. Berg, 91 Il.App.2d 166, 234 N.E.2d 400

(1968).
OPeople v. Marino, 95 Ill.App.2d 369, 238 N.E.2d 245 (1968).
uNote the requirement of (2) in M.C.C. 1973, § 94-6-302(3).
'People v. Marino, supra note 23 at 253.
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stolen property. '26 Therefore, prosecution under Ill. Rev. Stat., 1963,
27
§ 16-1(a) would exempt them from conviction.
The court held that the facts supported a conviction under Ill. Rev.
Stat., 1963, § 16-1(a) (1), stating:
. . . the facts show that the defendants were caught moving cases
of drugs which had been stolen from the Louis Zahn Drug Company
from Marino's garage into a truck. This is clearly exerting control
over the property of another. There is no question but that the
defendants were concealing the property '' and intended to deprive
the owner of the use and benefit thereof."
The defendants next argued that even if Marino's possession of the
drugs was unlawful, he was still an "owner" as defined in the Criminal
Code. 29 Therefore, they could only be charged under the lone subsection
which did not contain the word "owner"; that being Ill. Rev. Stat., 1963,
§ 16-1(d).
The court concluded that this argument had been rendered moot by
People v. Nunn :30
This contention misses the mark, however, because 16-1(a) (1) is not
limited to the theft of property in which only the actor who initiates
the wrongful asportation is guilty of the offense. A person who
'knowingly obtains or exerts control' over the property includes
but is not limited to the taking or carrying away of the property.
It also includes (though still not exclusively) the bringing about of
a transfer of possession of the property.' (Emphasis added.)
Thus, regardless of whether the defendants stole the property in the
first instance, if they later received possession, they "obtained control"
of the property within the meaning of Ill. Rev. Stat., 1963, § 16-1(a).
This plus the purpose of permanently depriving the owner of the property, was all that was required for conviction.
How the accused person acquired possession of another's property
is no longer significant. What is important, however, is that at the
time of arrest, the accused was purposely or knowingly exerting unauthorized control over the property evincing a purpose to deprive
the owner of it. This point can be further illustrated by the following
comparison of Illinois and Montana decisions.
The Illinois cases of Nunn3 2 and People v. Bullock 33 and the Montana
decision of State v. Fairbanks34 are very similar in factual contexts but
opposite in holdings. The reason for the difference stems from the fact

"ILL.

REV. STAT. 1963, Ch. 38,

§

16-1(d).

"'People v. Marino, supra note 23 at 253.
28d.
Old. at 253, 254.
8*People v. Nunn, 63 Ill.App.2d 465,
rePeople v. Marino, supra note 23 at
"People v. Nunn, supra note 30.
'People v. Bullock, 123 Il1.App.2d
"State v. Fairbanks, 140 Mont. 243,

212 N.E.2d 342 (1965).
254, citing People v. Nunn, supra note 28 at 344.
30, 259, N.E.2d 641 (1970).
370 P.2d 497 (1962).
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that present Illinois law no longer requires proof of the old common
law elements of larcency while pre-1974 Montana courts were still
burdened with them. All three cases involved an arrest of a person
who was stripping another's automobile of parts. As in the Marino case
above, there was little evidence produced at the trials to determine
whether the defendants were thieves or receivers. Illinois prosecuting attorneys filed informations under Ill. Rev. Stat., 1963, § 16-1(a), and the
appellate courts had little difficulty in finding that removing parts
from another's automobile was such an act that reasonable men would
conclude that it was a purposeful exercise of unauthorized control.3 5
In each case the defendant's conviction was sustained. In Fairbanks,the
auto stripper was charged with grand larceny. The Montana supreme
court, burdened with the traditional requirements of taking and asportation, held that evidence of these two elements was lacking and reversed
the defendant's conviction. 8 Suppose the Fairbanks case had been tried
under Illinois law today? The apparent answer is that Nunn and Bullock
would have had another cellmate. But what is most significant is that
the new Code offers a new start, a fresh beginning, IF the traditional
common law elements are cast aside.
CONCLUSION
The Montana Bar must realize that subsection (1) of the theft
section of the new Code is intended by the Criminal Law Commission
to cover all forms of theft, including receiving stolen property. Judicial
support for this contention is found in Marino. Theft under the new
Code simply requires that the accused ". . . purposely or knowingly
exercise unauthorized control over the property of another with the
purpose of depriving him of it."'3 7 Subsection (3) relating to receiving
stolen property was included only because the Commission felt that subsection (1) may have been too concise considering the vast field of law
that it covers.
It is unfortunate that Illinois carried over the old requirements of
receiving stolen property into their new code. Whether Montana, like
Illinois, incorporates the old elements of receving as set forth in Watkins
remains to be seen. However, the traditional elements of receiving which
have plagued the legal system in the past should not be carried forward.
To leave the tools of the past behind is not an easy task, especially for
one who has struggled a lifetime to master them. The prosecuting attorney who forgets the past and concentrates on the simple, concise logic
of the Code will be rewarded in the courtroom.

$People v. Nunn, supra note 30 at 345; People v. Bullock, supra note 33 at 643.
"State v. Fairbank8, supra note 34 at 498, 499.
-M.C.C. 1973, § 94-6-302(1).
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